

Risk Analysis in Safety and Security in Air Transportation

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Agenda

- Safety and Security in Air Transportation
- Safety Management
 - State Safety Program
 - Unintended Slide Deployment
 - Fuel for holding
- Security Management
 - SECONOMICS
- Discussion

Safety vs Security

- Critical in Civil Aviation
- Safety. Nature, Accidents
- Security. Purposeful (terrorism,...)
- Frequently dissociated (Even for resource allocation purposes!!!)

Safety vs Security



□ SAFETY


→ Safety is Critical in Civil Aviation

Rate of fatal accidents per 10 million flights per world region – 2001–08, scheduled passenger and cargo operations



We are doing well but...

...not enough



SAFETY

✈ Safety is Critical in Civil Aviation

- Increasing complexity of the global air transportation system;
- Interrelated and complex nature of aviation activities;
- Traffic growth and;
- Increasing competition forcing cost reduction (even more under recession)...

We need to assure the safe operation of aircrafts through tools and methodologies supporting the continuous evolution of a proactive strategy improving safety performance

However... relatively simple tools for safety risk analysis for commercial aviation operations

 SAFETY MANAGEMENT

| OCCURRENCE CATEGORY / EVENT TYPE | | | | | |
|----------------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|----------------|------------------|----------|
| RISK MATRIX | Without Safety Effect | Significant Incident | Major Incident | Serious Incident | Accident |
| Extremely Unlikely | Light Green | Light Green | Light Green | Light Green | Yellow |
| Extremely Remote | Light Green | Light Green | Light Green | Yellow | Red |
| Remote | Light Green | Light Green | Yellow | Red | Red |
| Reasonably Possible | Light Green | Yellow | Red | Red | Red |
| Frequent | Yellow | Red | Red | Red | Red |

ARMS, Bowtie, IRP,...



□ STATE SAFETY PROGRAMME?

- ICAO : “An integrated set of regulations and activities established by a State aimed at managing civil aviation safety”
- Support strategic decision-making in adopting better decisions when allocating scarce resources to higher safety risk areas
- To implement preventive approach for safety oversight and to manage safety at a State level, States must develop a State Safety Program (SSP)



□ SPANISH AVIATION INDUSTRY

- ✈ Aircraft Design and Production **14**
- ✈ Airlines **88**
- ✈ Aerial Work Companies **219**
- ✈ Aircraft Maintenance Org. **>150**
- ✈ Training Organizations **117**
- ✈ Aircraft (total) **6,400**
- ✈ Licensed personnel **>40,000**
- ✈ 232 airfields (47 airports)
- ✈ 62 ATM dependencies
- ✈ 340 Air Navigation Aids



□ SPANISH AVIATION INDUSTRY

✈ 204 M pax in Spanish Airports in 2011

▪ Madrid Barajas:

- » 49,671,270 pax
- » 429,390 Movements
- » 10th largest airport in the world, 4th in Europe

▪ Barcelona:

- » 34,398,226 pax
- » 303,054 Movements
- » 9th largest airport in Europe




PROJECT METHODOLOGY

- Incident forecasting
- Incident consequence assessment and forecasting
- Risk mapping
- Deciding on interventions
- Detailed analysis of chosen incidents

STATE SAFETY PROGRAMME ACTIVITIES


→ Mandatory Occurrence Reporting System (SNS & CEANITA)



INCIDENT FORECASTING: SAFETY RISK AREAS/ISSUES

OCCURRENCE GROUPING


- ECCAIRS Taxonomy too broad
- An extra classification exercise is




□ INCIDENT FORECASTING

- (Non-homogeneous) Poisson processes**
- Exploratory data analysis**
 - Base rate (operations, cycles, usage)**
 - Effects (Basic, seasonal, stress, geographical)**
- Expert prior elicitation**
- Forecasting incidents**
 - Annual forecast for risk assessment**
 - Monthly forecast for tracking incidents, alarm setting ('quality control')**

INCIDENT RATES. EXPLORATORY ANALYSIS.
RUNWAY INCURSIONS



Seasonal



Stress


INCIDENT RATES. EXPLORATORY ANALYSIS.

IS THE TYPE OF INCIDENT STANDARD?

| GROUP | OCCURRENCE CATEGORY | OCCURRENCE TYPE | GEOGRAPHICAL VARIATION | STRESS EFFECT | SEASONAL VARIATIONS |
|---------------------|---------------------|---|------------------------|---------------|---------------------|
| AIRPORT ENVIRONMENT | HANDLING | VEHICLE/EQUIPMENT COLLISION WITH A/C | NO | NO | NO |
| | | HANDLING PROCEDURES | NO | NO | NO |
| | | FLIGHT DISPATCH | NO | NO | NO |
| | | DANGEROUS GOODS | NO | NO | NO |
| | | INAPPROPRIATE VEHICLE MOVEMENTS | NO | NO | NO |
| | | HANDLING EQUIPMENT (MAINTENANCE AND AVAILABILITY) | NO | NO | YES |
| | INFRASTRUCTURE | DESIGN, BEACON AND OTHER SYSTEMS | NO | NO | NO |
| | | AIRPORT MAINTENANCE | NO | NO | NO |
| | | FOD | NO | NO | NO |
| | | AIRPORT SERVICES | NO | NO | NO |
| | GROUND COLLISION | PROPELLED A/C | NO | NO | NO |
| | | NO PROPELLED A/C | NO | NO | NO |
| | | GROUND LOSS OF SEPARATION | NO | NO | NO |
| | ANIMAL INCURSION | IN RUNWAY | YES | NO | NO |
| | | IN RAMP/TWY | YES | NO | NO |

INCIDENT FORECASTING: BASIC MODEL

→ ID



→ Model

$$X_k | \lambda, n_k \sim \text{Po}(\lambda n_k)$$

45

60

75

| | 2009 | 2010 | 2011 |
|------------|------|-------|-------|
| 9 | 110 | 286 | 326 |
| 0.15 | 2.31 | 4.42 | 6.56 |
| No. Inc | 101 | 176 | 140 |
| No. Oper | 2.16 | 2.11 | 2.14 |
| Pred. Inc. | 130 | 100.5 | 136.4 |
| Pred. Std. | 41 | 17 | 8.4 |

□ INCIDENT FORECASTING: SEASONAL, STRESS, RELATED INCIDENTS, DYNAMIC


→ For type k incident

$$X_k | \lambda_k, n_k \sim Po(\lambda n_k)$$

$$u_k = \log(\lambda_k)$$

$$u_k = F_k \theta_k + v_k, \quad v_k \sim N(0, V)$$

$$\theta_k = G_k \theta_{k-1} + w_k, \quad w_k \sim N(0, W)$$



→ Particle filtering for update and forecasting

→ Geographical effect. Clustering, Hierarchical model

INCIDENT FORECASTING. TYPES OF INCIDENTS

MINOR

An incident which has no safety significance. N.B. This appears to be a contradiction with the ICAO definition of an incident:

SIGNIFICANT INCIDENT

An incident involving circumstances indicating that an accident, a serious or major incident could have occurred, if the risk had not been managed within safety margins, or if another aircraft had been in the vicinity.

MAJOR INCIDENT

An incident associated with the operation of an aircraft, which safety of aircraft may have been compromised, having led to a near collision between aircraft with ground or obstacles.

SERIOUS INCIDENT

An incident involving circumstances indicating that an accident nearly occurred.


ACCIDENT

An occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft which takes place between the time any person boards the aircraft with the intention of flight until such time as all such persons have disembarked, in which: a) a person is fatally or seriously orb) the aircraft sustains damage or structural failure orc) the aircraft is missing or is completely inaccessible.

Predefined by ICAO and EUROCONTROL

FORECASTING INCIDENT CONSEQUENCES

→ Model



☐ FORECASTING INCIDENT CONSEQUENCES

➤ Initial approach

| Acc | Serious | Major | Significant | Minor |
|-----|---------|-------|-------------|-------|
| 300 | 100 | 25 | 1 | 0.25 |

➤ General initial model

| BIRD STRIKE EVENT SEVERITY | RELATED COSTS | | | | | |
|----------------------------------|---------------|----------|--------|---------------|-----------|-------|
| | Fatalities | Injuries | Delays | Compensations | Repairing | Image |
| ACCIDENT | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |
| SERIOUS INCIDENT | 0 | 0 | 80 | 80 | 50 | 80 |
| MAJOR INCIDENT | 0 | 0 | 30 | 30 | 0 | 60 |
| SIGNIFICANT INCIDENT | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 30 |
| MINOR INCIDENT | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 10 |

$$p_1F_1 + p_2F_2 + p_3F_3 + p_4F_4 + p_5F_5$$

Each F_i decomposed in terms. Each term a triangular

➤ Detailed analysis for interesting incidents, as available


☐ FORECASTING INCIDENT CONSEQUENCES

✈ **Expected costs**

✈ **Expected number of incidents**

✈ **(FOR A LARGE NUMBER OF YEARS)**


```
GENERATE RATE
GENERATE TYPE PROBABILITIES
INPUT NUMBER OF OPERATIONS
GENERATE N(O.INCIDENTS)
FOR I=1 TO N
  GENERATE TYPE
  GENERATE COST
```



□ RISK MAPPING


→ **Mapping (forecasted) incident numbers vs (forecasted) incident costs** (expected, boxplots)

| | |
|-------------------------|-------------------------|
| Less but more expensive | More and more expensive |
| Less and less expensive | More but less expensive |




RISK MAPPING


Annual comparison



DECIDING ON INTERVENTIONS



DECIDING ON INTERVENTIONS



→ (FOR A LARGE NUMBER OF YEARS)

COST=-X(=SUM X_I)

INPUT N(UMBER OF OPERATIONS)

FOR EACH TYPE OF INCIDENT

GENERATE RATE

GENERATE TYPE PROBS.

GENERATE N(0. INCIDENTS)

FOR I=1 TO N

GENERATE INCIDENT

GENERATE TYPE

GENERATE COST_TYPE

COST=COST+COST_TYPE

COST=COST/N

SIMULATE FOR SEVERAL X

FIT REGRESSION METAMODEL

OPTIMIZE GIVEN BUDGET

□ DECIDING ON INTERVENTIONS

→ Deterministic version

$$x = (x_1, \dots, x_l) \quad \Psi(x) = \sum_j \left[(\lambda_{x_j}^j \times n) \sum_{i=1}^5 p_{x_j}^{ij} E(\text{Cost}_i^j | x_j) \right] - \sum x_j$$

$$\lambda_{x_j}^j = \lambda^j \exp(-k_j x_j)$$

$$E(\text{Cost}_i^j | x_j) = E(\text{Cost}_i^j | 0) \exp(-c_j x_j)$$


$$\min \Psi(x) \text{ s.t. } \sum_j x_j \leq B$$

$$p_{x_j}^{ij} = p_0^{ij} \exp(-p_{ij} x_j), i = 2, \dots, 5$$

$$p_{x_j}^{1j} = 1 - \sum p_{x_j}^{ij}$$

□ DECIDING ON INTERVENTIONS

- Pick those in the anti-Pareto frontier**
 - Pick some of those more costly**
 - Pick some of those more frequent**
 - Pick those that go worse**
 - Pick novel issues**
-
- Relate with resource allocation**
-
- Screened by experts**
 - Finally decided by politicians**



'TOP 10' 2011



**Airport environment:
Handling**



**Aircraft operations:
Operations at low altitude, runway excursions**



**Air navigation service:
Runway incursions, TCAS notices, airspace
infringement**



**Airworthiness:
Engine system failure in general aviation**



**Emerging issues:
Bird strikes, laser disruptions**

DETAILED ANALYSIS FOR SOME INCIDENTS


- ✈ *Unintended slide deployment*
- ✈ *Fuel for holding*
- ✈ *Runway excursions*

❑ UNINTENDED SLIDE DEPLOYMENT



□ UNINTENDED SLIDE DEPLOYMENT

- ✈ Unintended slide deployment under normal operations
- ✈ Inflatable slides to facilitate passenger evacuation in emergency situations
- ✈ (Expected) cost 20 million USD/year for the whole industry



□ UNINTENDED SLIDE DEPLOYMENT. DETAILED INCIDENT ANALYSIS

➔ **The following potentially affecting factors are identified**

| Factor | Relevance | Factor levels |
|---------------|---------------|--------------------------|
| Aircraft type | Yes, Moderate | A > B |
| Airport | No | Nearly 50 |
| Pairing day | Yes | First > Second > Third |
| Flight turn | Yes | First > (Second, Third) |

➔ **We build a logistic regression model with three explanatory variables**

➔ **Relevant operational phase and personnel involved**

| Factor | Relevance ranking |
|-------------------|---|
| Operational phase | Arrival > Departure >> Refueling > Preflight = Stopover |
| Staff involved | (A, B) > (C,D,E,F,G,H,I) |

➔ **7 errors, 9 procedure interruptions, 19 procedure non compliances (Dirichlet model)**

UNINTENDED SLIDE DEPLOYMENT. DETAILED COST ANALYSIS

→ Costs


- **Removal cost**

- » Lab x Tm
- » Tm. Expert assesses min (30), max (60), most likely (45). Adjust triangular distribution with 0.05, 0.95 quantiles at min, max . Tri (0.385,0.75,1.115)

- **Transportation cost**

- **Repair cost**

- **Ground delay associated costs**



UNINTENDED SLIDE DEPLOYMENT. DETAILED COST ANALYSIS

→ Costs in relation with delays




$$T_d = p_0 I_0 + p_1 F_d \quad p_0 | data \sim Be(14, 23)$$

$$p_0 + p_1 = 1$$

$$p_0, p_1 \geq 0$$

$$F_{dB} \sim Wei(\theta = 0, \alpha, \beta)$$

$$F_{dA} \sim p Wei(\theta = 0, \alpha, \beta) + (1 - p) Wei(\theta, \alpha, \beta),$$



| | A Flights (Min, most likely, max) | B Flights (Min, most likely, max) |
|----------------------------|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| Passenger Hard Costs | (0.12, 0.19, 0.24) | (0.12, 0.19, 0.24) |
| Passenger Soft Costs | (0.06, 0.19, 0.22) | (0.06, 0.19, 0.22) |
| Marginal Crew Costs | (0.00, 14.00, 39.00) | (0.00, 7.90, 16.59) |
| Marginal Maintenance Costs | (0.65, 0.81, 0.97) | (0.38, 0.47, 0.56) |
| Total Costs | (0.83, 15.19, 40.27) | (0.56, 8.75, 17.61) |

❑ UNINTENDED SLIDE DEPLOYMENT: RISK MANAGEMENT

➤ Countermeasures

- Change procedure (to 'eliminate' interruptions and mitigate errors, practically no cost)
- Training course to key personnel
- Awareness campaign to key personnel through newsletters, etc...
- Light and sound warning device at each door
- Visual reminders at each door


➤ We only affect incident likelihood, but not incident severity

| Countermeasure | 1 year | 5 years | Countermeasure | 1 year | 5 years |
|-------------------------|---------|---------|-------------------------|---------|---------|
| Procedure revision | 252902 | 1214935 | Awareness campaign | 123724 | 567739 |
| Awareness campaign | 524477 | 2492943 | Warning devices, St. 1 | 1302529 | 1312149 |
| Warning devices, St. 1 | 1307393 | 1335514 | Warning devices, St. 2 | 352862 | 873480 |
| Warning devices, St. 2 | 616058 | 2137866 | Visual reminders, St. 1 | 273448 | 1161478 |
| Visual reminders, St. 1 | 631403 | 2881078 | Visual reminders, St. 2 | 236060 | 1108918 |
| Visual reminders, St. 2 | 677329 | 3228759 | None | 252902 | 1214935 |
| None | 663400 | 1490047 | | | |


- For a company which implemented the procedure revision from 20/year to 6/year

☐ FUEL FOR HOLDING

- ✈ Competition forces companies to reduce costs, without jeopardising safety.
- ✈ Fuel costs more than 25% DOC
- ✈ ATFM delays at congested airports. 1250 M euros in total costs, average.
- ✈ Airline fuel policies and regulatory requirements should ensure every flight carries enough fuel for the planned route, and additional reserve to cover deviations; e.g. ATFM delays.
- ✈ When delays occur at destination, holding may be required by ATC.
- ✈ Flight crew will be able to hold depending on the remaining fuel quantity. Inability to hold will cause divert to an alternative airport. Not a simple decision, as it entails significant DOCs.



□ FUEL FOR HOLDING: MODEL



| Case | x | y | FCP | Delay holding costs | Diversion plus handling costs |
|------|---------|-------------|-----|---------------------|-------------------------------|
| 1 | $x > 0$ | $y > x$ | Yes | No | Yes |
| 2 | $x > 0$ | $y \leq x$ | Yes | Yes | No |
| 3 | $x > 0$ | $y = 0$ | Yes | No | No |
| 4 | $x = 0$ | $y > x = 0$ | No | No | Yes |
| 5 | $x = 0$ | $y = 0$ | No | No | No |

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
$$\max_{x \geq 0} \psi(x) = \int \left\{ p \cdot u(x, 0, \bar{d}) + (1-p) \left[\int_{y \leq x} f(y) u(x, y, \bar{d}) dy + \int_{y > x} f(y) u(x, y, d) dy \right] \right\} g(p) dp.$$

□ FUEL FOR HOLDING: DETAILED COSTS

- Diversion costs, $C_{Diversion}$.
 1. Proceeding from the holding point to the alternate airport (*En-Route Phase 1 Delay Cost*), C_1 .
 2. Turnaround at the alternate airport (*At-Gate Phase 2 Delay Cost*), C_2 . We include also *Handling costs*, $C_{Handling}$.
 3. Proceeding from the alternate airport to the original destination airport (*En-Route Phase 3 Delay Cost*), C_3 .
- Delay holding costs, $C_{Holding}$.
- Fuel carriage penalty costs, C_{FCP} .

□ FFH: CASE

$$p|data \sim \mathcal{Be}(1 + s, 1 + n - s).$$



We adopt a gamma mixture model approach with four mixture components, corresponding to four full turns when holding.

$$f(y|w, \mu, \nu) = \sum_{i=1}^4 w_i \cdot \mathcal{G}(y|\nu_i, \nu_i/\mu_i)$$


$w \sim \mathcal{D}(\phi) \rightsquigarrow$ a Dirichlet distribution,

$\nu_i \sim \mathcal{E}(\theta) \rightsquigarrow$ an exponential distribution, $i = 1, \dots, 4$,

$\mu_i \sim \mathcal{IG}(\alpha, \beta) \rightsquigarrow$ an inverted gamma distribution, $i = 1, \dots, 4$,

□ FFH: CASE

- A flight approaches the destination airport at 09:00 LT after 9 hours and 35 mins of flight time. The aircraft was dispatched at the departing airport with 2,490 kg of fuel for holding 20 minutes at destination in case of ATFM delays.
- We set $T_{\max} = 60$ min, dividing $[0, T]$ in $M = 120$ subintervals of length $l = T/M = 30$ s. We then undertake a Monte Carlo approximation at each time






- Type of airplane
- Risk Aversion
- Image costs

SECURITY

- EU project: SECONOMICS
- Economics of Security for critical infrastructures
 - National Grid
 - Airport
 - Metro
- Adversarial risk analysis
- ARA+RA

SECONOMICS



□ DISCUSSION: PROJECT RELEVANCE

- ✈ **To our knowledge, first time that DA used in processes related with preventive approach to safety oversight in civil aviation**
- ✈ **Aviation remains one of the most advanced means of transportation technologically wise. But the industry and regulators have implemented little modern DA methodologies**

DISCUSSION: CURRENT ISSUES

- ✈ **Detailed analysis of further incidents**
- ✈ **Automating/speeding analysis**
- ✈ **Policy models. Private-public partnership. Sharing costs**
- ✈ **Safety vs security. SECONOMICS**