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Cyber Security and Critical Asset Protection



David Willacy



Background



- Historically operational assets such as breakers were mechanically operated, this evolved to become electromechanical operation monitored by specialist Operational Technology (OT) systems.
- Operational technologies have evolved and are now based upon the same standard Information Technology (IT) as we have in the office and home such as Microsoft Windows.
- This convergence of distinctly different operating environments (OT IT) has fundamentally changed the risk landscape.





What the heck has cyber security got to do with Electricity?


The level of exploitation of IT within the Energy sector as a whole will continue to grow, driven by initiatives such as SMART grid, smart metering, Enterprise Asset Management, Advanced Network Control Systems and Complex Event Processing.

The key question is how to deal with lifecycle management and security for IT in the engineering environment...



Example Modern Remote Telemetry Unit







- J1 Touchscreen controller
- J2 Power (5V DC)
- J3 Power (10-30V DC)
- J4 Audio
- J5 JTAG
- J6 10/100BaseTX Ethernet
- J7 GPIO
- J8 Dual USB host
- J9 Camera interface
- J10 USB client
- J11 Serial port COM1
- J12 64-way PC/104 expansion
- J13 40-way PC/104 expansion
- J14 LCD panel interface
- J15 Serial port COM2
- J16 LCD panel LVDS interface
- J17 CAN bus
- J18 Serial port (RS422/485)
- J19 Serial ports (COM3/4)
- J20 CF+ interface
- J21 IEEE802.15.4 / ZigBee
- J22 SDIO
- J23 Wireless interface
- J24 Backlight power.



Changing world



- Recently a pilotless passenger plane flew over Britain, the aviation industry is predicting pilotless aviation as a commercial reality in the next few years. They state that human error is the main risk, so why not take the human out of the equation, this can also hold true for the key control systems in the electricity network
- It used to be possible to run electricity networks manually by manning sites and sending the key data by phone. In many transmission networks this is no longer the case
- As we put more and more intelligence into the assets that we use to run our critical systems like power, we have to manage the increased risk of accidental or malicious failure
- So what are the key risks to those assets?



Embedded Vulnerabilities



- There is a risk that due to the lack of security awareness when purchasing, upgrading and deploying IT and OT assets into energy companies that vulnerabilities and malware are introduced.
- Consequences if risk materialises Loss of key systems supporting electricity delivery; impairing and impacting the ability to manage electricity networks

Acquiring embedded risk through uninformed procurement.





Widely Available Vulnerability Data



- There is a risk that information about the technology widely used across the electricity sector and how to affect its operation is now widely available on the internet.
- Consequences if risk materialises Loss of key systems supporting electricity delivery; impairing and impacting the ability to manage electricity networks

Information about how to hack proprietary insecure protocols like Modbus is available on the internet



Inappropriate Lifecycle Management



- No appropriate IT asset management strategy or process:-
- IT assets do not have a thirty year lifespan, this needs to be factored into both depreciation and investment planning
- No patching no anti malware protection
- Little understanding of the threats
- No defined / managed secure perimeter, the increasing use of wireless / remote IT technology
- Little coordination between corporate IT managed systems and business managed systems
- Consequences if risk materialises Loss of key systems supporting electricity delivery; impairing and impacting the ability to manage electricity networks

Millions is spent protecting corporate IT, but little on the operational technology that is critical to running key operational systems





Shared Threats

- There is an increasing risk of system failure due to the increased threat level evidenced by events within the energy sector, the level of sophistication is increasing on a daily basis with new malware targeting both OT and IT.
- Consequences if risk materialises Loss of key systems supporting electricity delivery; impairing and impacting the ability to manage electricity networks

Thousands of variants of viruses are made daily, one day a virus will have the right DNA to damage key energy assets unless they are protected



Increased connectivity

- Increasing connectivity and accessibility provides more and more points of access into the energy sector. Electricity networks are no longer stand alone but are connected to many other systems, companies and networks.
- Consequences if risk materialises –
 Loss of key systems supporting national
 Grid operations that could significantly
 impair and impact our ability to manage
 our networks.

We are opening more doors than we are closing





Interdependence



Electricity transmission is dependant on many other sectors like generation, distribution and even telecoms

All other CNI sectors have a dependency upon electricity in one way or another

These interdependencies need to be mapped to ensure the associated risks are managed. Iterative risk assessments are one of the most powerful tools, if done well, to drive an on-going security strategy and program



So what are we doing?




- ENTSOE has a number of groups that are working to protect the critical assets of the electricity transmission networks
 - Critical Systems Protection (CSP)
 - Electronic Highway Working Group (EHWG)
 - Cyber Security Special Interest Group (CSSIG)





EUROPEAN ENERGY SECTOR CYBER SECURITY KEY STAKEHOLDERS







How can we protect critical cyber assets?



A lot of the legacy systems are hard to protect so what can we do!

- Understand the Business Risk
- Understand the Vulnerabilities
- Establish ongoing Governance
- Implementing Secure Architecture
 - Perimeter Defence
 - Malware Protection
 - Manage Physical security
- Improve Awareness and Skills
- Establish Response Capabilities
- Manage Third Party Risk
- Engage Projects
- Procurement



Conclusion



- A lot of work is being carried out to protect key energy cyber assets however more could be done. The energy sector is evolving at a rapid rate renewable generation is adding to the need for ever smarter systems. The dependence of the energy sector upon standard IT is growing as is the threat level.
- The growing dependence of critical power infrastructures on interconnected physical and cyber-based control systems has resulted in a growing and previously unforeseen cyber security threat to supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) and distributed control systems (DCSs).
- It is critical that engineers and managers understand these issues, cyber security and the use of risk assessments that quantitatively determine the probability of an attack, the impact of the attack, and the reduction in risk associated with particular countermeasures are required.

